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Abstract
In this paper we use survey data to examine support among voters from differ-
ent age cohorts for public school spending. The survey asked potential voters in
California how they intended to vote on two initiatives, one a statewide initiative
that would increase spending on public schools throughout the state and the other
a local initiative that would increase spending only in the respondents local school
district. We find that older voters without children generally oppose increases in
state spending but are much more willing to support local spending. We examine
two explanations for this voting pattern, namely the capitalization of local spend-
ing into housing values and intergenerational altruism. Our results do not strongly
favor one explanation over the other. Consequently, we conclude that both fac-
tors (capitalization and intergenerational altruism) probably play important roles
in sustaining support among older voters for local school spending.
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I. Introduction 
 
Over the next three decades the share of elderly individuals in the U.S. population will grow 
substantially.  In 2000, approximately 12.8 percent of the population was age 65 or older.  According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, that percentage will increase to 20.1 by 2030.  Furthermore, as the baby-boom 
generation ages, the number of households headed by individuals over the age of 55 is predicted to 
increase sharply, from 34.9 percent in 2000 to around 39.6 percent in 2010.  Not surprisingly, the 
growing share of older households will be accompanied by a decline in the share of households with 
school-age children.  For example, U.S. Census Bureau projections indicate the share of family 
households with school-age children will decline from 46.2 percent in 2000 to 41.3 percent in 2010.  
These changes in the demographic structure of the U.S. population have led to growing concern that the 
next several decades will witness an increase in intergenerational conflict.  Of particular concern is how 
an aging America will affect support for government services that benefit mainly the young, especially 
K-12 education.  If individuals vote in their own self-interest, support for public school spending will 
likely diminish as the share of older voters without school-age children in the population grows. 
Poterba (1997) provides empirical evidence that suggests this concern may be well founded.  Using 
state-level data on K-12 educational expenditures from 1961 to 1991, he finds that, all else equal, per-
pupil spending declines significantly as the share of the population age 65 or older increases.  Poterba 
also finds that per-capita spending on non-educational related services increases with the share of the 
population age 65 and older.  These results are consistent with an elderly population voting in their own 
self-interest and suggest that intergenerational conflict over the provision of public goods will likely 
increase as the population ages.  
That conclusion, however, has recently been challenged by two studies.   Ladd and Murray (2001) 
examine support among the elderly for public school spending using county-level data on educational 
expenditures in 1970, 1980, and 1990.  Using a specification similar to that used by Poterba (1997), they 
find that the share of the population age 65 or older has no effect on county-level per-pupil spending.   
Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001) examine support among the elderly for public school spending at both 
the state and school district levels.  They find that the elderly's support for public school spending is 
stronger at the local level than it is at the state level.   An increase in the share of elderly significantly 
reduces support for state-level spending on education but has only a modest negative effect on support 
for district-level spending.   
 The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on support among voters from different 
age cohorts for public school spending.  Our analysis differs from the previous work on this issue in one 
key respect.  Poterba (1997), Ladd and Murray (2001) and Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001) all use 
aggregate data on school expenditures and the fraction of elderly within a jurisdiction.  By regressing 
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either state or local expenditures per pupil on the fraction of the population age 65 or older, these studies 
provide indirect evidence on how age and the presence of school-age children affects support for public 
school spending proposals.  In contrast, for this study we have the results of an October 2002 survey 
conducted by the Public Policy Institute of California.  The survey asked 2,007 potential voters in 
California how they intended to vote on two initiatives, one a statewide initiative on the November 2002 
ballot that would increase spending on public schools throughout the state, and the other a hypothetical 
local initiative that would increase spending only in the respondent’s own school district.  The survey 
also asked voters their age, whether they had school children, whether or not they were a homeowner, 
and other demographic questions.  Using that information, we can directly examine how support for 
public school spending varies with a voter’s age and whether or not the voter has children in public 
school.  We can also directly examine how support for public school spending differs at the state and 
local level.  
 Consistent with the findings of Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001), we find that older voters 
without children are much less willing to support state-level spending on schools than local spending.  
In particular, we find that middle-age and elderly voters without children generally oppose increases in 
state-level spending but are much more willing to support increases in local spending.  In section V, we 
consider two plausible explanations for the voting pattern we observe, namely the capitalization of local 
spending into housing values, and intergenerational altruism.  Our results do not strongly favor one 
explanation over the other. 
 
II.  The PPIC Survey 
 
 In October 2002, PPIC surveyed 2,007 potential voters concerning issues related to the 
November 2002 ballot.  The survey was conducted by telephone, using a random-dialing procedure, and 
was restricted to people age eighteen or older.  Baldassare (2002) compares the distributions of various 
characteristics among survey respondents with the distributions of those characteristics from the 2000 
Census.  He finds that the survey distributions are quite similar to the Census distributions, indicating 
that the survey was successful in obtaining a representative sample of California residents. 
 Our analysis focuses on two survey questions.  The first asked respondents how they intended to 
vote on Proposition 47, a statewide initiative that asked voters to approve a $13.05 billion dollar bond 
issue to finance school construction and modernization projects throughout the state.  The second asked 
respondents how they would vote on a hypothetical bond issue that would be used to finance school 
construction and modernization projects only in their own school districts.  Specifically, respondents 
were asked the following two questions: 
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State Initiative 
“Also on the November ballot is Proposition 47, the "Kindergarten to University Public 
Education Facilities Bond Act of 2002." This $13.05 billion bond issue will provide 
funding for necessary education facilities to relieve overcrowding and to repair older 
schools. The funds will be targeted to areas of greatest need. Funds will also be used to 
upgrade and build new classrooms in California community colleges, California State 
University, and the University of California. The projected fiscal impact includes state 
costs of about $26.2 billion over 30 years to pay off the bonds, with payments of about 
$873 million annually. If the election were held today, would you vote yes or no on 
Proposition 47?” 
 
Local Initiative 
“If your local school district had a bond measure on the November ballot to pay for 
school construction projects, would you vote yes or no?” 
 
From the text it is evident that the questions are essentially state and local versions of the same 
issue, a parallel reinforced by their proximity in the survey.  However, they also differ in several 
important ways that may affect responses.  One important difference is the designation of funds raised 
through the bond measures.  As the survey text makes explicit, funds raised from Proposition 47 would 
be used to finance both University and K-12 school improvements.  In contrast, funds raised from the 
local initiative would be used solely to finance K-12 school improvements.  However, we believe this 
distinction is less important than it may appear.  Of the $13.05 billion in funding voters were asked to 
approve with Proposition 47, around 87 percent was earmarked for K-12 schools.  If respondents 
understood that the measure was overwhelmingly for public primary and secondary schools, as it had 
been presented to the public, it seems unlikely that this distinction had a large impact on responses to 
the two questions. 
A second important difference is in the specific information presented to respondents about the 
two bond issues.  When respondents were asked how they intended to vote on Proposition 47, they were 
first told the exact amount of the bond issue, the likely financing cost, and the length of the repayment 
schedule.  In contrast, no such information is provided for the hypothetical bond issue.  The literature on 
survey design using referendum-style questions for polling or valuation cautions that wording and 
details can affect the results of a survey, usually in predictable ways.1  For example, if researchers 
include additional details on cost to a hypothetical referendum designed to illicit voter support for a 
particular program, the fraction of respondents supporting the program tends to fall.  Similarly, greater 
detail on the benefits of a program tends to increase the fraction of respondents supporting the program.  
The PPIC’s wording of the two survey questions may therefore cause respondents to be less supportive 
of Proposition 47 than the local measure, which lacks comparable detail on costs.  Our concern, 
                                                 
1 See for example Mitchell and Carson (1989). 
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however, is not with the level of support for state versus local spending but rather with how support for 
state and local spending varies with the age profile of respondents.  As long as voters of all ages 
interpret the two questions in a similar manner, it seems unlikely that this aspect of the wording of the 
questions will bias our results. 
Finally, a potentially more serious concern is that a large portion of Proposition 47 bond 
revenue was targeted to high-need areas.  According to the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, out 
of the $11.5 billion in bond revenue designated for K-12 school improvements, $6.5 billion, or 57 
percent, was earmarked for backlogged projects and critically overcrowded schools.  It is likely that 
some voters responded to the Proposition 47 question differently than to the local bond referenda 
question for exactly that reason:  they perceived that Proposition 47 funds were not going to be spent on 
their schools.  If the distribution of Proposition 47 spending across communities is correlated with the 
residential location of old and young voters, this could bias our results.  For example, if a larger fraction 
of young voters live in communities with backlogged projects or overcrowded schools, we might 
erroneously attribute weak support for Proposition 47 among the elderly to a preference for local over 
state school spending, when in fact their weak support for state spending is due primarily to where 
Proposition 47 funding is being targeted.  We return to this issue in section IV.  
 
Cross Tabulations of Voter Support for State and Local Initiatives 
We begin by presenting simple cross tabulations of voter support for the state and local 
initiatives.  It is well documented that homeowners and renters tend to have different preferences for 
school spending.  Furthermore, as we discuss in Section V, the effect of age on support for school 
spending is likely to differ for renters and homeowners.  Consequently, rather than pooling renters and 
homeowners in our sample, we analyze the voting behavior of homeowners and renters separately.  The 
first part of our analysis focuses on the voting behavior of homeowners.  We then examine the voting 
behavior of renters in Section V. 
Of the 2,007 respondents in the PPIC survey, 1,193 were homeowners.2  Of these 1,193 
respondents, 7 did not answer the question about how they intended to vote on Proposition 47 and 6 did 
not answer the question on how they would vote on a local bond measure, yielding 1,180 observations 
for our analysis.  Of these respondents, 61 percent intended to vote yes on Proposition 47 and 69 percent 
indicated they would vote yes on a local bond measure. 
                                                 
2 In the survey, 1,207 respondents stated they were homeowners.  However, 14 of those respondents under the age 
of 25 also responded that they had owned their home for 10 years or more.  We believe these respondents were 
actually living in their parent’s home and therefore excluded them from the analysis yielding a sample of 1,193 
homeowners. 
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Table 1 
Children in School and Support for State and Local Initiatives, Homeowners 
Intended Vote State Initiative Intended Vote Local Initiative  
Presence of School Age 
Children  
(N) 
Yes No Don’t Know Yes No Don’t Know 
No Children 
  (719) 
57.2% 33.8% 10.0% 65.4% 27.3% 7.3% 
Public School 
  (392) 
67.1 25.5 7.4 75.3 21.2 3.5 
Pre-School Age or  
Private School 
  (68) 
66.2 26.5 7.3 67.7 25.0 7.3 
* One of the 1,180 respondents did not answer the presence of school age children question. 
 
 
Table 1 presents cross-tabulations of voting percentages by whether or not respondents had 
children in public school.   The PPIC survey allows us to identify three groups of voters: those with no 
children under the age of 18, those with children in public school, and those with either pre-school age 
children or children in private school.   The Table reports separate voting percentages for each of these 
groups.  As expected, homeowners with children in public school were more likely to support both the 
statewide initiative and the local initiative.  Table 1 also reveals that both homeowners without children 
and homeowners with children in public school were more likely to support the local initiative than the 
state initiative.   
Table 2 documents how support for the two initiatives varied with the age of respondents.  The 
Table separates homeowners into three groups: all homeowners, those with no children, and those with 
children in public school.  For each group, the Table lists percentages intending to vote for the two 
initiatives by age group.  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 reveal that the voting pattern of all homeowners is 
consistent with the hypothesis that older voters are less likely to support public school spending than 
younger voters, particularly state-level spending.  Column 3 reveals that the fraction of voters 
supporting the statewide initiative declines with age up to age 55, at which point it increases slightly.  
Column 4 reveals that a similar pattern holds for the local initiative.  That finding is consistent with the 
results of Vinovskis (1993).  Using data from the 1988 American National Election Study, he finds that 
77 percent of respondents under that age of 30 supported increases in federal spending for public 
schools.  Furthermore, he finds that support for increased spending declines monotonically with older  
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Table 2 
Age and Support for State and Local Initiatives, Homeowners 
 All Homeowners 
(1,171) 
No Children 
(714) 
Children in Public School 
(389) 
Age 
  
N State 
Initiative 
Local 
Initiative 
N State 
Initiative 
Local 
Initiative 
N State 
Initiative 
Local 
Initiative 
          
18-34 
 
169 74.6% 78.1% 68 77.9% 
 
77.9% 
 
75 74.3% 
 
82.6% 
 
35-44 
 
266 65.8 74.8 81 61.7 
 
70.4 
 
161 67.7 
 
80.0 
 
45-54 
 
283 56.9 64.0 159 52.8 
 
63.5 
 
114 61.9 
 
63.7 
 
55-64 
   
219 55.7 66.2 180 53.3 
 
63.3 
 
35 65.7 
 
80.0 
 
65 or older 
  
234 56.0 64.5 226 55.7 64.2 4 100 100 
* One respondent did not answer the presence of school age children question and eight respondents did not 
answer the age question yielding a sample of 1,171 homeowners. 
 
 
age groups (measured in ten year intervals) reaching a low of 46.9 percent among respondents age 70 or 
older.3  
A comparison of the voting percentages for voters with no children and those with children in 
public school reveals that most of the drop off in support for school spending can be attributed to the 
voting behavior of voters without children.  Relative to younger voters, the percentage of voters without 
children favoring both the state and local initiatives declines markedly among voters age 45 or older, 
although the drop off in support among older voters is much stronger for the statewide initiative.  In 
contrast, for voters with children in public school there is no clear relationship between age and support 
for either the state or local initiative.  While voters with children in public school between the ages of 45 
and 54 appear less likely to support either initiative relative to voters in other age groups, in general the 
oldest voters don’t appear to vote much differently than younger voters.  Rubinfeld (1977) reaches a 
similar conclusion.  Using a survey of voters in two local school elections in the Detroit area, he finds 
that, conditional on having children in public school, age has no effect on support for public school 
spending.  He also finds that voters with children in public school are much more likely to support 
public school spending.   
                                                 
3 Ponza et al. (1988) obtain similar results using data from the 1986 General Social Survey.  Specifically, they find 
that 74 percent of respondents under the age of 35 believed spending on public education was too low.  In contrast, 
only 50% of respondents age 65 or older believed spending on public education was too low. 
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III. Multivariate Analysis 
 
 The results reported in Table 2 suggest that, relative to younger voters, older voters without 
children are less likely to support school spending, particularly state-level spending.  However, those 
results do not control for other factors, such as income, education and ideology that might be correlated 
with both the demand for school spending and age.  We therefore turn to multivariate analysis to isolate 
the impact of age on support for school spending.  We begin by estimating a binary logit model using 
data only from those respondents who stated they would vote yes or no on the statewide and local 
initiatives and exclude those who stated they did not know how they would vote on these initiatives.  
We then expand our analysis to include those voters who did not know how they would vote and 
estimate an ordered logit model in which voters that stated they did not know how they would vote are 
classified as indifferent.   
 Table 3 lists the explanatory variables we use in our analysis.  We use the same set of variables 
to explain voting behavior on the statewide initiative and the local initiative.  We define four age 
dummies to examine the impact of age on support for public school spending: the omitted group in the 
analysis that follows is always voters between the ages of 18 and 34.  Since conservative voters tend to 
be less supportive of increases in government spending in general, we expect ideology to have a 
negative effect on support for both the statewide and local initiatives.  Prior studies that use survey data 
to estimate the demand for public education generally find that, all else equal, women tend to have 
higher demand for public school spending than men.4  Consequently, we also include a dummy variable 
that takes the value of unity if the respondent is female.  
We include two other explanatory variables that deserve discussion.  The first variable is the 
respondent’s expectations of the future economic conditions in California.  Specifically, respondents 
were asked:  “Turning to the economic conditions in California, do you think that during the next 12 
months we will have good times financially or bad times?”  As noted by Inman (1983) and Holtz-Eakin 
and Rosen (1993), expectations about future income and other economic conditions should play a 
critical role in models of demand for local public capital.  We therefore include a dummy variable that 
takes the value of unity if the respondent expected good economic conditions during the next 12 
months.  
                                                 
4 See for example, Rubinfeld (1977) and Bergstrom, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1982). 
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Table 3 
Description of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Description 
Age 35-44 1 = 35 to 44, 0 = all other age groups 
 
Age 45-54 1 = 45 to 54, 0 = all other age groups 
 
Age 55-64 1 = 55 to 64, 0 = all other age groups 
 
Age 65+ 1 = 65 or older, 0 = all other age groups 
 
Ideology 1 = very liberal, 2 = somewhat liberal,  
3 = middle-of-the-road, 4 = somewhat conservative, 5 = very 
conservative 
 
White 1 = Caucasian or White and not Hispanic,  
0 = all other groups 
 
Female 1 = female, 0 = male 
 
Income 1 = under $20,000; 2 = $20,000 to $39,999;  
3 = $40,000 to $59,999; 4 = $60,000 to $79,999; 5 = $80,000 to 
$99,999; 6 = $100,000 or more 
 
College 1 = college graduate or post-graduate, 0 = all other education levels 
 
Outlook 1 = good financial times over next year, 0 = bad financial times or 
uncertain financial times over next year 
 
Years in Current Residence 1 = less than 5 years, 2 = 5 to 9 years, 3 = 10 to 19 years, 4 = 20 
years or longer 
 
The second variable is the number of years a homeowner has lived in their current residence.  
Our reason for including this variable is related to Proposition 13, a 1978 statewide proposition that 
capped property tax rates at one percent of assessed valuation throughout the state.  Proposition 13 also 
changed when and how property was assessed for tax purposes in California.  Specifically, after the 
passage of Proposition 13, property could only be reassessed upon a change in ownership, at which 
point the property was assessed at full market value.  As a result, the assessed value and market value of 
homes in California can differ substantially depending on when a home was purchased.  In general, the 
longer a resident has lived in their home, the larger the gap between market value and assessed value.  
Since years of current home ownership is undoubtedly positively correlated with age, older voters are 
likely to face a lower tax price for school spending than younger voters. 5   If we did not control for 
                                                 
5 The simple correlation between years in current residence and the age of homeowners with no children in our 
sample is 0.42, confirming that age and the number of years a homeowner has owned their current home are 
strongly positively correlated.   
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years in current residence in our analysis, this positive correlation could lead us to understate the effect 
of age on support for local school spending. 
The survey data have a number of limitations.  The first limitation concerns missing 
observations.  Two respondents did not answer the question about educational attainment and an 
additional four respondents did not answer the question about future economic conditions.  We excluded 
these respondents from the analysis.  A larger number of respondents did not answer the questions about 
income, ethnicity and ideology.  Specifically, 95 respondents failed to answer the income question, 29 
failed to answer the ethnicity question and 17 failed to answer the ideology question.  Rather than 
exclude these respondents from our analysis, we created three dummy variables indicating whether 
observations on income, ethnicity or ideology were missing.  These dummy variables take the value of 
unity if the observation is missing and zero otherwise.  We then included the income, ethnicity and 
ideology variables (with missing values recoded to zero) and the three missing value dummy variables 
in our analysis. 
Finally, as we noted earlier, the PPIC survey allows us to identify three groups of voters:  those 
with no children under the age of 18, those with children in public school and those with either pre-
school age children or children in private school.  The last group is problematic since it combines two 
groups that most likely have very different preferences for school spending.  We would expect voters 
with children in private school to oppose increases in public school spending.  In contrast, given that 
most students attend public schools, we would expect the majority of voters with pre-school age 
children to support increases in public school spending.  Because we can’t separate voters with pre-
school children and voters with private school children, we proceed by focusing only on voters with no 
children and voters with children in public school.  Our final sample consists of 607 voters without 
children and 351 voters with children in public school that stated they would vote yes or no on the 
statewide and local initiatives.   
Sample means of the variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 4.  The mean of each 
variable is reported separately for voters with no children and voters with children in public school.  As 
expected, voters with no children tend to be older than voters with children in public school.  
Furthermore, consistent with the changing demographic patterns in California, a larger fraction of voters 
with no children tended to be white. 
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Table 4 
Sample Means, Homeowners 
 
Variable No Children Children in 
Public School 
 
Vote on State Initiative (1=yes, 0=no) 
 
 
0.64 
 
0.73 
Vote on Local Initiative (1=yes, 0=no) 
 
0.70 0.77 
Age 35-44 0.11 0.40 
 
Age 45-54 
 
0.23 0.30 
Age 55-64 
 
0.26 0.09 
Age 65+ 
 
0.30 0.01 
Ideologya 
 
3.08 3.08 
Whiteb 
 
0.79 0.64 
Female 0.52 0.51 
 
Incomec 3.74 4.04 
 
College 
 
0.50 0.48 
Outlook 
 
0.37 0.39 
Years in Current Residence 
 
2.62 
 
2.05 
Number of Observations 607 351 
 
a  mean does not include 17 respondents who did not answer the ideology question. 
b mean does not include 29 respondents who did not answer the ethnicity question. 
c mean does not include 95 respondents who did not answer the income question. 
 
 
Binary Logit and Ordered Logit Results 
Results for the binary logit model are reported in Table 5.  We use interaction terms to allow the 
effect of age to differ for homeowners without children and homeowners with children in public school.  
Specifically, we created two sets of interaction terms.  The first set is the interaction of the age dummies 
with a dummy variable that takes the value of unity for homeowners without children.  The second set is 
the interaction of the age dummies with a dummy variable that takes that value of unity for homeowners 
with children in public school.  Note that the control group for the age coefficients is all homeowners 
under the age of 35.  Thus, the age coefficients reported in the first four rows of Table 5 reveal the effect 
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of age on support for public school spending for voters without children relative to voters under the age 
of 35.  Similarly, the age coefficients reported in the next three columns reveal the effect of age on 
support for public school spending for voters with children relative to voters under the age of 35.6  
Among the voters with children in public school, only four were age 65 or older and all four of those 
respondents stated they would support both the state and local initiatives.  Consequently the age 65 or 
older dummy for voters with children in public school perfectly predicts a yes vote.  We therefore 
combined the age 55-64 and age 65+ groups for the voters with children in public school and created a 
new dummy variable, age 55+, that takes the value of unity if a voter with children in public school is 
55 or older.7   
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 report the estimated logit coefficients for the statewide and local 
initiatives respectively.  Columns 3 and 5 report associated marginal effects evaluated for a respondent 
with the median characteristics:  under the age of 35, ideologically “middle of the road,” white, female, 
income between $40,000 and $59,999, no college degree, a pessimistic view of future economic 
conditions, and 5 to 10 years in their current residence.8  In the statewide regression, all the estimated 
age coefficients for homeowners without children are negative and all but one (the age 35 to 44 
coefficient) are statistically different from zero at the ten-percent level or better.  Thus, our results 
suggest that older voters without children are significantly less likely to support state-level public school 
spending than young voters.  For example, based on the marginal effects reported in column three, our 
results suggest that homeowners without children between the ages of 45 and 54 are 24 percentage 
points less likely to vote yes on the statewide initiative than homeowners under the age of 35.  Similarly, 
homeowners without children between the ages of 55 and 64 are 20 percentage points less likely to vote 
yes on the statewide initiative.  For homeowners with children in public school the effect of age is less 
clear.  Homeowners with children between the ages of 45 and 54 are less likely than younger voters to 
support state-level spending.  However, homeowners with children between the ages of 35 and 44 and 
55 and 64 are no less likely to support state-level spending. 
                                                 
6 Our empirical model assumes support for school spending among voters under the age of 35 does not depend on 
whether or not a voter has children in public school.  To test the validity of that assumption, we estimated an 
expanded model that included a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if a homeowner had children in 
public school.   This allows support for school spending among voters under the age of 35 to vary by whether or 
not they have children in public school.  The estimated coefficient on this dummy variable was statistically 
insignificant in both the binary and ordered logit models suggesting that all voters under the age of 35 have similar 
preferences for school spending.   
7 We also re-estimated the model excluding the four voters with children in public school who were 65 or older.  
The results were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. 
8 For dummy variables the marginal effects are calculated using the change in the value of a dummy variable from 
zero to one.   
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Table 5 
Binary Logit, Homeowners (N=958) 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
 
 State Initiative Local Initiative 
Variable Logit Coefficients Marginal Effects Logit Coefficients Marginal Effects 
Age Interacted with No 
Children 
    
Age 35-44 -0.46 
(0.37) 
 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.39) 
-0.004 
(0.074) 
Age 45-54    -1.05** 
(0.32) 
 
   -0.24** 
(0.07) 
  -0.53* 
(0.32) 
  -0.11* 
(0.066) 
Age 55-64    -0.91** 
(0.32) 
 
   -0.20** 
(0.07) 
-0.45 
(0.32) 
-0.09 
(0.066) 
Age 65+  -0.57* 
(0.32) 
  -0.12* 
(0.06) 
-0.18 
(0.33) 
-0.036 
(0.065) 
Age Interacted with 
Children in Public School 
    
Age 35-44 -0.33 
(0.32) 
 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
0.19 
(0.33) 
0.033 
(0.06) 
Age 45-54    -0.81** 
(0.34) 
 
    -0.18** 
(0.07) 
  -0.65* 
(0.34) 
   -0.143** 
(0.072) 
Age 55+ 0.42 
(0.50) 
 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.89 
(0.55) 
0.133 
(0.071) 
Other Control Variables     
Ideology    -0.46** 
(0.07) 
 
   -0.08** 
(0.02) 
   -0.43** 
(0.07) 
   -0.08** 
(0.01) 
White    -0.70** 
(0.20) 
 
   -0.11** 
(0.03) 
   -0.73** 
(0.21) 
   -0.11** 
(0.03) 
Female    0.43** 
(0.15) 
 
   0.09** 
(0.03) 
  0.29* 
(0.16) 
  0.06* 
(0.03) 
Income 
 
0.006 
(0.05) 
 
0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.056) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
College 
 
   0.47** 
(0.16) 
 
   0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Outlook    0.65** 
(0.16) 
 
   0.10** 
(0.03) 
   0.58** 
(0.17) 
   0.09** 
(0.03) 
Years in Current    
Residence 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
Constant    2.78** 
(0.42) 
___     
 
    2.96** 
(0.43) 
____ 
*Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level.
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 In the local regression, all the estimated age coefficients for homeowners without children are 
once again negative.  However, in contrast to the statewide results, only one of the age coefficients is 
statistically significant.  More importantly, a comparison of the marginal effects reported in columns 3 
and 5 reveals that age has a much larger effect on support for state spending than it does on support for 
local spending:  all the estimated marginal effects for the age dummies in the local regression are much 
smaller in magnitude.  For example, while homeowners without children between the ages of 55 and 64 
are 20 percentage points less likely to vote yes on the statewide initiative than younger voters, they are 
only 9 percentage points less likely to vote yes on the local initiative.  Our results therefore suggest that 
middle-age and elderly voters without children are much less likely to support state level spending than 
local spending, a finding consistent with Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001).   
The estimates reported in Table 5 are based on a sample that excluded 139 respondents that 
stated they did not know how they would vote on the statewide and local initiatives.  To incorporate 
those respondents into our analysis, we assume voters that stated they did not know how they would 
vote were indifferent about the outcome of an initiative.  Specifically, for each initiative we define a 
new variable that takes a value of 3 if a respondent intended to vote yes, a value of 2 if the respondent 
was indifferent, and a value of 1 if the respondent intended to vote no.  We then use these new 
dependent variables to estimate an ordered logit model.  
Table 6 reports estimates from the ordered logit model.  The results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported in Table 5.  In the statewide regression, with the exception of the coefficient on the age 
35 to 44 dummy, all of the coefficients on the age dummies for homeowners without children are 
negative and statistically significant at the ten-percent level or better.  Furthermore, the marginal effects 
reported in columns 3 and 5 of Table 6 once again suggest that homeowners without children are much 
less likely to support state spending than local spending.  The age coefficients for homeowners with 
children in public school are also similar to those reported in Table 5.  Specifically, among homeowners 
with children in public school, only voters between the ages of 45 and 54 appear less likely than 
younger voters to support either the statewide or local initiative.   
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Table 6 
Ordered Logit, Homeowners (N= 1,097) 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
 
 State Initiative Local Initiative 
Variable Logit Coefficients Marginal Effects Logit Coefficients Marginal Effects 
Age Interacted with No 
Children 
    
Age 35-44 -0.46 
(0.31) 
 
    -0.11* 
(0.07) 
-0.25 
(0.33) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
Age 45-54     -0.91** 
(0.27) 
 
    -0.22** 
(0.06) 
    -0.61** 
(0.28) 
    -0.14** 
(0.06) 
Age 55-64     -0.75** 
(0.26) 
 
    -0.18** 
(0.06) 
  -0.55* 
(0.28) 
    -0.12** 
(0.06) 
Age 65+   -0.50* 
(0.26) 
    -0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.34 
(0.28) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
Age Interacted with 
Children in Public School 
    
Age 35-44 -0.26 
(0.26) 
 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.29) 
0.007 
(0.058) 
Age 45-54     -0.60** 
(0.29) 
 
    -0.14** 
(0.07) 
    -0.67** 
(0.30) 
    -0.15** 
(0.07) 
Age 55+ 0.17 
(0.39) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.71 
(0.47) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
Other Control Variables     
Ideology     -0.42** 
(0.06) 
 
    -0.09** 
(0.01) 
    -0.41** 
(0.06) 
    -0.08** 
(0.01) 
White     -0.62** 
(0.16) 
 
    -0.12** 
(0.03) 
    -0.68** 
(0.18) 
    -0.11** 
(0.03) 
Female     0.41** 
(0.13) 
 
    0.09** 
(0.03) 
    0.31** 
(0.14) 
    0.068** 
(0.030) 
Income 
 
0.01 
(0.05) 
 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
College 
 
    0.32** 
(0.14) 
 
    0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Outlook 
 
   0.60** 
(0.14) 
 
   0.12** 
(0.03) 
   0.59** 
(0.15) 
   0.10** 
(0.03) 
Years in Current    
Residence 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
Lower Cutoff   -2.68** 
(0.35) 
 
___    -2.85** 
(0.38) 
___ 
Upper Cutoff     -2.23** 
(0.35) 
___     
 
    -2.53** 
(0.38) 
____ 
*Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level. 
 15
The coefficients on the age dummies for homeowners without children in the binary and 
ordered logit regressions reveal another interesting pattern.  The coefficients decline in magnitude 
(increasing support for the measure) with older groups after age 35-44, a pattern that holds for both the 
statewide and local initiative.  With self-interested voting behavior, the greater support among voters 
between the ages of 35 and 44 is expected: undoubtedly some of these voters are still considering 
having children and those children will most likely attend public schools in the future.  However, it is 
unlikely that voters in the age 45-54, age 55-64 or age 65 or older categories are still considering having 
children.  Consequently, with self-interested voting behavior, one would expect voters without children 
in all three of these age groups to be equally opposed to increases in school spending.  Our results, 
however, indicate otherwise.  For example, the results reported in column 3 of Table 5, reveal that while 
homeowners without children between the ages of 45 and 54 are 24 percentage points less likely than 
younger voters to support the state initiative, homeowners without children over the age of 65 are only 
12 percentage points less likely to support the statewide initiative.9   
That the elderly appear to be more “generous” than other individuals is not entirely surprising 
given the literature on voluntary contributions.  Numerous studies have found that, controlling for 
income, education and a variety of other factors, voluntary contributions increase markedly with age.10  
Clotfelter (1997) and others have argued that the relative generosity of the elderly in terms of voluntary 
giving is most likely due to life-cycle effects.  Individuals of all generations simply become more 
generous as death approaches.  One form of a life-cycle effect that may explain why elderly voters are 
more willing to support school spending than middle-age voters is intergenerational altruism.  
Specifically, relative to middle-age voters without children, elderly voters are more likely to have 
grandchildren who attend public schools in their local community or within the state.  Consequently, 
they are more likely to be altruistically linked to the current generation of school children and thus be 
more willing to support school spending.   
While life-cycle effects could certainly explain why elderly voters appear more willing to 
support school spending than middle-age voters without children, Putnam (1995) offers a different 
explanation.  He argues that the propensity of the elderly to be more generous has more to do with 
generational or cohort effects than simple life-cycle effects.  Using data from the General Social Survey 
(GSS) he finds that the inclination to engage in civil society, everything from the involvement in 
community organizations to voting, is much stronger among elderly Americans than among baby 
                                                 
9 Furthermore, the results of a likelihood ratio test for the equality of parameter estimates reveals that, in the state 
initiative regressions, the two coefficients are statistically different from each other at the ten-percent significance 
level in both the binary and ordered logit models.  However, in the local initiative regressions one cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the two coefficients are the same.   
10 See for example, Auten and Joulfaian (1996) and Randolph (1995).  For an overview of estimated age effects in 
studies of charitable giving see Clotfelter (1985). 
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boomers.11  Furthermore, he finds that the pattern of civic engagement is inconsistent with simple life-
cycle effects but strongly consistent with generational effects.   
Whether the generosity of the elderly has more to do with life-cycle effects or generational 
effects has important implications for the future support of public school spending.  If the generosity of 
the elderly is due to life-cycle effects, the lack of support for public school spending among middle-age 
voters without children may diminish over time as these voters age.  In contrast, if the generosity of the 
elderly has more to do with generational effects, support for public school spending, particularly state-
level spending, may continue to decline as the baby-boom generation ages.  We return to this issue in 
Sections V and VI. 
 
IV. Targeted State Funding and Tiebout Sorting 
 
 As we discussed in section II, one potential concern with the estimates reported in Tables 5 and 
6 is that a large portion of Proposition 47 funding was targeted to high-need areas.  If the distribution of 
old and young voters within the state varies with where Proposition 47 funds were likely to be spent, our 
state-level estimates of the impact of age on support for school spending will be biased.  One method of 
controlling for this problem is to focus only on within-community variation in the age distribution of 
voters and support for the statewide initiative.  By eliminating unobservable community-specific effects 
from our analysis, we essentially eliminate any correlation between the age profile of voters and the 
distribution of Proposition 47 funding.  While we do not know the school district in which respondents 
live, we do know which county they live in.  As a result, we can estimate a fixed effects logit model that 
controls for any county-specific effects that may be correlated with the age distribution of voters.  
 Focusing on within-county variations also helps address another problem that may affect our 
local initiative estimates, namely Tiebout bias.  To illustrate the potential for Tiebout bias consider the 
following example.  Suppose that voters sort themselves among communities according to their demand 
for public school quality.  Elderly voters sort themselves into communities with relatively low spending 
per pupil to avoid paying high property taxes, while young voters who are considering having children 
sort themselves into communities with relatively high spending per pupil.  The age distribution of voters 
would then be correlated with unobservable community characteristics, such as the reputation of a 
community for having high-quality schools.  This in turn would cause the age profile of voters in our 
sample to be negatively correlated with the error term.  As a result, our local estimates would tend to 
overstate the effect of age on local support for local school spending.   
Focusing only on within-county variations helps eliminate the potential for Tiebout bias since it 
eliminates any correlation between the error term in our model and the age profile of voters across 
                                                 
11 In particular see Table 5 in Putnam (1995).  
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counties.  However, as noted by Ladd and Murray (2001), it may not eliminate Tiebout bias.  To the 
extent that most sorting occurs within counties rather than across counties, the potential for Tiebout bias 
remains.  We do not know how serious a problem this is, however, the results of several studies suggest 
that county fixed effects remove most of the bias introduced by Tiebout sorting.  For example, in their 
analysis of the relationship between county-level spending per pupil and the fraction of the population 
age 65 or older, Ladd and Murray (2001) use instrumental variables in an attempt to control for any 
Tiebout bias that might remain after including county fixed effects.  They find that the coefficient 
estimates from the models that include county fixed effects, but do not instrument for the fraction of the 
population age 65 or older, are similar to those found when both county fixed effects and instrumental 
variable techniques are used.  Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001) reach a similar conclusion.  
Specifically, they find that, once county fixed effects have been included, controlling for within-county 
sorting using instrumental variables reduces the magnitude of the coefficient on the fraction of the 
population age 65 or older but only slightly. 
Parameter estimates for the fixed-effects logit model are presented in Table 7.  The parameter 
estimates for the statewide initiative are similar to those reported in the second column of Table 5, 
suggesting that the targeting of state funds to high-needs areas does not significantly bias our estimates.  
Controlling for county specific fixed effects has a larger impact on our local initiative estimates.  For 
homeowners without children none of the age coefficients are statistically different from zero.  
Furthermore, with the exception of the coefficient on age 35 to 44, all of the age coefficients for 
homeowners without children reported in Table 7 are smaller in magnitude than those reported in 
column 4 of Table 5.  For example, the point estimate for the age 55 to 64 reported in Table 5 is –0.45.  
In the fixed effects logit model, the point estimate on that dummy falls to -0.25.  That finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that our local estimates tend to overstate the effect of age on local support 
for local school spending when Tiebout sorting is not accounted for.   
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Table 7 
Fixed Effect Logit, Homeowners  
Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
Variable 
 
State Initiative Local Initiative 
Age Interacted with No Children   
Age 35-44  -0.56 
(0.38) 
 
-0.07 
(0.39) 
Age 45-54     -1.04** 
(0.33) 
 
-0.41 
(0.34) 
Age 55-64     -0.83** 
(0.34) 
 
-0.25 
(0.34) 
Age 65+ -0.52 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
Age Interacted with Children in 
Public School 
  
Age 35-44 -0.21 
(0.33) 
 
0.31 
(0.35) 
Age 45-54     -0.77** 
(0.35) 
 
-0.57 
(0.35) 
Age 55+ 0.49 
(0.51) 
1.03* 
(0.56) 
Other Control Variables   
Ideology     -0.44** 
(0.07) 
 
    -0.41** 
(0.08) 
White     -0.62** 
(0.21) 
 
    -0.76** 
(0.22) 
Female     0.46** 
(0.16) 
 
  0.28* 
(0.16) 
Income 
 
0.003 
(0.057) 
 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
College 
 
    0.46** 
(0.17) 
 
0.17 
(0.17) 
Outlook    0.71** 
(0.17) 
 
   0.63** 
(0.18) 
Years in Current    
Residence 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
  -0.15* 
(0.08) 
Observations 927 914 
    *Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level. 
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V. Capitalization, Altruism, and Support for School Spending 
 
Tables 5 through 7 consistently demonstrate that middle-age and elderly homeowners without 
children are more likely to support local spending than state spending on schools.  In Table 5 for 
example, the estimated marginal effects for the age dummies in the local regression are all less than half 
the magnitude of the corresponding marginal effects in the statewide regression.  If the age coefficients 
are effectively measuring a decline in the value of improved school quality to older voters, what causes 
the strong preference for local over state spending? 
As noted by Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001), one likely explanation is capitalization.  An 
increase in state spending improves the quality of all schools within a state, leaving the overall 
distribution of school quality unchanged.  Since capitalization derives from relative differences in 
school quality across communities, capitalization of state spending is unlikely.  In contrast, when a local 
community decides to increase school spending, school quality in that district rises relative to 
neighboring districts.  The relative rise in school quality attracts families with children to the community 
causing the spending increase to be capitalized into housing values.  While neither an increase in state 
nor local spending offers older homeowners without children any direct benefit, the capitalization of 
local school spending into housing provides a clear motivation for these voters to prefer an increase in 
local versus state spending.12 
Of course capitalization is only a valid explanation of the voting pattern we observe if 
homeowners are aware of what causes capitalization.  Is the voting behavior of homeowners really 
guided by the likely impact of voting outcomes on their housing values?  Fischel (2001a, 2001b) 
emphatically argues that the answer to this question is yes.  As he points out, for most homeowners, 
their home constitutes the vast majority of their wealth.  As a result, they are likely to be keenly aware 
of the factors that affect the value of their largest asset.  Fischel describes individuals motivated 
exclusively by capitalization effects as “homevoters.”  To a homevoter, local and statewide financing of 
the same public good would represent very different proposals.  
Both the theoretical and empirical local public finance literature contains significant evidence 
that capitalization influences voting behavior.  For example, on the theoretical side, Brueckner and Joo 
(1991) develop a model of voting behavior on municipal capital spending (such as the construction of a 
new school) in the presence of capitalization.  They demonstrate that with capitalization, the voting 
behavior of homeowners will reflect both their own preferences for capital spending and those of 
                                                 
12 Numerous studies find school quality is in fact capitalized into housing values (see for example, Oates, 1969; 
Bogart and Cromwell, 1997; and Black, 1999).  A weaker link may exist between school facilities and quality 
(usually measured by student performance), but the validity of capitalization as a theory of behavior in this case 
rests on voters’ belief that better facilities attract young families to the community, not on actual educational 
quality improvements.   
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potential buyers of their home.  As a result, elderly voters who receive no direct consumption benefit 
from a construction project may still vote in favor of the project to enhance the value of their home to a 
potential buyer.     
On the empirical side, Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) provide perhaps the most direct evidence 
that capitalization affects voting behavior.  Using survey data, they examine the voting behavior of 
homeowners without children on a 2000 school voucher initiative in California.  Although the 
educational opportunities provided by a voucher may be of little concern to homeowners without 
children, the potential impact of a voucher on property values may be a much bigger concern.  As the 
authors note, homes located in communities with good public schools sell at a premium.  By subsidizing 
private competitors, a voucher would reduce the premium families were willing to pay to live in 
communities with good schools, causing property values in those communities to fall.  These potential 
capital losses would affect all homeowners, including those without children.  The authors find that, all 
else equal, homeowners without children were significantly less likely to vote for the voucher if they 
lived in a community with good public schools, supporting the hypothesis that the voting behavior of 
homeowners was guided by a desire to protect property values. 
While capitalization certainly could explain why older homeowners without children prefer 
local over state spending, another likely explanation is intergenerational altruism.13  As noted by Poterba 
(1998) and Ladd and Murray (2001), to the extent that the elderly care about the welfare of future 
generations, altruism could reduce their opposition to spending on education.  We also observed earlier, 
in Tables 5-7, that elderly voters tend to be more supportive of school spending than middle-aged voters 
without children, a finding that is consistent with the hypothesis that the elderly are motivated by 
intergenerational altruism.  While altruism could affect support for school spending at both the state and 
local level, we would argue that it is likely to have a much larger effect on support for local school 
spending.  That would certainly be the case if middle-age and elderly voters without children had 
grandchildren who attended their community’s local public schools or if they had friends with children 
in the local public schools.  In any event, to the extent that older voters without children care more about 
the welfare of children in their own community than the welfare of children in other parts of the state, 
intergenerational altruism could explain why they have stronger preferences for local spending.  
Is the apparent preference for local over statewide financing due to capitalization, or do local 
public schools inspire significant altruism among middle-age and elderly homeowners without children?  
                                                 
13  Poterba (1997, 1998) and Ladd and Murray (2001) discuss in detail other reasons why the elderly may continue 
to support public school spending.  For example, Ladd and Murray (2001) note that if the elderly recognize the 
importance of having a well educated and highly paid work force, they may continue to support school spending in 
order to preserve the tax base necessary to finance programs that support the elderly in the future.  However, it is 
unclear why this explanation would lead the elderly to prefer local over state spending on schools.   
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The PPIC survey did not ask respondents why they intended to vote for or against an increase in state or 
local school spending and thus we can provide no direct evidence on whether capitalization or 
intergenerational altruism explains why older voters without children appear much more willing to 
support local spending than state spending on schools.  Nevertheless, there may be an indirect way to 
distinguish between these two competing explanations.   
As we noted above, even though older homeowners without children receive no direct benefit 
from an increase in local school spending, the capitalization of school spending into housing values may 
provide them with an indirect benefit.  In contrast, older renters receive neither a direct nor an indirect 
benefit from an increase in local school spending:  without school-age children they receive no direct 
benefit and without property they receive no indirect benefit.  In fact, to the extent that increased school 
spending raises property values, they face the real possibility of paying higher rents if they support an 
increase in local school spending.  As a result, if capitalization underlies the voting behavior we 
observe, older renters should be less willing to support an increase in local school spending than older 
homeowners.  On the other hand, we have no reason to suspect that the degree of intergenerational 
altruism depends on homeownership.  Thus, if intergenerational altruism underlies the voting behavior 
we observe, it seems likely that the voting behavior of older renters without children should be similar 
to the voting behavior of older homeowners without children. 
To examine whether capitalization or intergenerational altruism better explains the voting 
pattern we observe, we estimated the same logit models as in Table 5, using a sample consisting 
exclusively of renters.  Among the 591 renters without children or children in public school, one 
respondent did not answer the question about the presence of school-age children, two did not report 
their age, two did not report their educational attainment, one did not report the number of years they 
lived in their current residence, and one did not answer the question about future economic conditions, 
leaving a sample of 584 renters.  Among these renters, 37 were college students.  Because college 
students often attend schools located outside their local community or even their home state, they are 
likely to view increases in state or local spending differently than other renters.  As a result, we 
eliminated college students from the sample leaving a final sample of 547 renters.   
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Table 8 
Binary Logit, Renters (N=547) 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
 State Initiative Local Initiative 
Variable Logit Coefficients Marginal Effects Logit Coefficients Marginal Effects 
Age Interacted with No 
Children 
    
Age 35-44    -1.76** 
(0.38) 
 
   -0.38** 
(0.08) 
   -1.19** 
(0.38) 
   -0.25** 
(0.09) 
Age 45-54    -0.83** 
(0.42) 
 
  -0.15* 
(0.08) 
-0.75* 
(0.40) 
  -0.142* 
(0.084) 
Age 55-64    -2.20** 
(0.49) 
 
   -0.48** 
(0.10) 
   -1.40** 
(0.49) 
  -0.30** 
(0.12) 
Age 65+    -1.51** 
(0.48) 
   -0.32** 
(0.11) 
0.26 
(0.67) 
0.037 
(0.09) 
Age Interacted with 
Children in Public School 
    
Age 35-44 -0.53 
(0.38) 
 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.31 
(0.39) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
Age 45-54   -0.81* 
(0.48) 
 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
-0.69 
(0.47) 
-0.13 
(0.10) 
Age 55+ -0.23 
(1.10) 
 
-0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.10 
(1.11) 
-0.016 
(0.18) 
Other Control Variables     
Ideology    -0.47** 
(0.12) 
 
   -0.07** 
(0.02) 
   -0.29** 
(0.11) 
   -0.05** 
(0.02) 
White   -0.45* 
(0.26) 
 
  -0.06* 
(0.03) 
   -0.55** 
(0.26) 
  -0.07* 
(0.04) 
Female -0.06 
(0.25) 
 
-0.008 
(0.03) 
0.15 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
Income 
 
   -0.22** 
(0.10) 
 
  -0.03* 
(0.016) 
    -0.20** 
(0.09) 
  -0.03* 
(0.017) 
College 
 
  0.58* 
(0.31) 
 
  0.068* 
(0.038) 
  0.60* 
(0.32) 
  0.076* 
(0.04) 
Outlook    0.68** 
(0.27) 
 
   0.08** 
(0.03) 
   0.81** 
(0.28) 
   0.10** 
(0.04) 
Years in Current    
Residence 
0.12 
(0.14) 
 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Constant    3.87** 
(0.57) 
___     
 
    3.22** 
(0.56) 
____ 
*Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level. 
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Results based on the sample of renters are reported in Table 8.  In general the results do not 
strongly favor one explanation over the other.  On the one hand, a comparison of the results reported in 
columns 4 and 5 of Tables 5 and 8 reveals that, relative to older homeowners without children, older 
renters without children appear less likely to support local spending.  For example, with the exception of 
the coefficient on the age 65 or older dummy, all of the age coefficients for renters without children are 
negative and statistically significant at the ten-percent level or better.  In contrast, only one of the age 
coefficients for homeowners without children is negative and statistically significant.  Furthermore, a 
comparison of the marginal effects for the local regressions in Tables 5 and 8 reveals that, with the 
exception of the marginal effect for renters age 65 or older, the magnitude of the estimated marginal 
effects for the age dummies in the renter regression are all larger in magnitude than the corresponding 
marginal effects in the homeowner regression.14  For example, the results reported in Table 8 suggest 
that renters between the ages of 55 and 64 are 30 percentage points less likely to support the local 
initiative than younger renters.  In contrast, the results reported in Table 5 suggest that homeowners 
between the ages of 55 and 64 are only 9 percentage points less likely to support the local initiative than 
younger homeowners.   These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that capitalization leads older 
homeowners without children to prefer local over state spending on schools.   
On the other hand, the results reported in Table 8 clearly show that, similar to older 
homeowners without children, older renters without children are much more likely to support local 
spending than state spending on schools.  A comparison of the marginal effects reported in columns 3 
and 5 of Table 8 reveals that age has a much larger effect on support for state spending than it does on 
support for local spending.  For example, while renters age 65 or older are 32 percentage points less 
likely to vote yes on the statewide initiative than younger voters, they are no less likely to vote yes on 
the local initiative.  That finding is consistent with the hypothesis that intergenerational altruism leads 
older voters without children to prefer local over state spending on schools. 
Table A1 in the appendix reports coefficient estimates for the fixed-effects logit model using the 
sample of renters.  The results reported in Table A1 once again do not strongly favor one explanation 
(capitalization or intergenerational altruism) over the other.  With the exception of the coefficient on the 
age 65 or older dummy, all of the age coefficients for renters without children reported in column 3 of 
Table A1 are negative and statistically significant.  In contrast, none of the age coefficients for 
homeowners without children reported in column 3 of Table 7 are statistically significant.  That finding 
is consistent with the hypothesis that capitalization underlies the voting behavior of older voters without 
                                                 
14  The marginal effects reported in Table 8 were evaluated at the same values of the independent variables used to 
calculate the marginal effects listed in Table 5, namely: under the age of 35, ideologically “middle of the road,” 
white, female, income between $40,000 and $59,999, no college degree, a pessimistic view of future economic 
conditions, and 5 to 10 years in their current residence. 
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children.  However, the results reported in Table A1 also suggest that older renters are much more likely 
to support local spending than state spending on schools.  That finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
that intergenerational altruism underlies the voting behavior of older voters without children.  
 One might argue the apparent preference among renters for local over state spending is simply 
due to renter allusion.  It is well documented that renters tend to be much more willing to support 
increases in local expenditures than homeowners.  Unlike homeowners, renters do not directly pay the 
property tax and therefore do not directly observe the tax-price associated with increases in local 
spending.  As a result, they tend to be more willing than homeowners to support local spending 
increases.  However, we question whether renter allusion can explain our results for two reasons.  First, 
among renters 75 percent stated they would support the state initiative and 79 percent stated they would 
support the local initiative.  Among homeowners 61 percent favored the state initiative and 69 favored 
the local initiative.  Thus, while renters are 4 percentage points more likely to support local spending, 
homeowners are 8 percentage points more likely to support local spending.  If renter allusion were 
driving our results we would expect renters to have much stronger preferences for local spending over 
state spending than homeowners.  In fact, just the opposite is true.  Second, if renters really believed 
they did not pay for local spending increases one would expect renters of all ages to equally favor local 
spending increases.  The results reported in Table 8 and Table A1, however, indicate otherwise: older 
renters without children appear less supportive of local spending increases than younger voters.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
   In January of 2003, the Oregon state legislature asked voters to approve a statewide income tax 
measure that would restore funding for K-12 education and other government services that were 
scheduled to be cut due to budget shortfalls.  Oregon voters rejected the measure.  In May of 2003, 
voters in Beaverton Oregon were asked to approve a property tax increase to restore funding for their 
local public schools.  Despite the fact that over 66 percent of households in Beaverton have no children 
in school, and a majority of voters in Beaverton opposed the statewide measure in January, in May 
nearly 60 percent of voters in Beaverton voted in favor of the local property tax increase.  Evidently, 
voters in Beaverton were much more willing to support local spending on schools than state spending.  
The recent election results in Oregon are consistent with the findings in this paper.  Our results 
clearly show that older homeowners without children are more supportive of local spending on schools 
than state spending.  It is less clear whether the higher support for local spending is motivated by 
capitalization or altruism.  Our interpretation of the results reported in Table 8 is that both motives 
probably play important roles in maintaining support among older voters without children for local 
school spending.   
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Our results also clearly show that both middle-age and elderly voters without children generally 
oppose state spending on schools.  That finding may have important policy implications for the future of 
educational funding.  Over the last three decades states across the country have transferred the authority 
for funding k-12 education from local communities to the state in response to court challenges over the 
constitutionality of their school finance systems.  Our results suggest that the movement from local to 
state finance may have an adverse affect on support for school spending.  If middle-age and elderly 
voters without children oppose state level spending on schools, support for K-12 education in states with 
state-financed systems will likely diminish. 
Finally, concern over how an aging population will affect support for public school spending 
might be allayed by evidence that the elderly support spending to an unexpected degree, but only if this 
support is not unique to this generation of older voters.  That is, will the baby boomers, a cohort that 
inevitably represents the largest-ever retiree proportion of the population, also support public school 
spending to the same degree as the current generation of retirees?   Certainly evidence that school 
quality is capitalized into property values, and that voters are aware of this, suggests a permanent 
motivation for support of local school spending that is based on a broad conception of self-interest.  But 
to the extent that support for school spending is driven by altruism, then continued support may depend 
on the source of that altruism.  Our results indicate that baby-boom voters, ages 45 to 64, may currently 
be slightly less supportive of state and local school spending than voters age 65 and over.  If the 
generosity of the elderly is due to life-cycle effects, support for school spending, even state level 
spending, may increase among baby-boomers as they age.  However, it may also be that current retirees 
are simply more altruistic than successive generations because of cohort or generational effects.   If 
states and local school districts can not count on similar generosity from baby boomers in retirement, 
then the future adequacy of financing for public schools is a genuine concern. 
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Table A1 
Fixed Effect Logit, Renters  
Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
Variable 
 
State Initiative Local Initiative 
Age Interacted with No Children   
Age 35-44     -1.58** 
(0.39) 
 
    -1.04** 
(0.40) 
Age 45-54 -0.62 
(0.45) 
 
  -0.72* 
(0.42) 
Age 55-64     -2.06** 
(0.53) 
 
    -1.16** 
(0.55) 
Age 65+    -1.09** 
(0.52) 
0.21 
(0.71) 
Age Interacted with Children in 
Public School 
  
Age 35-44 -0.14 
(0.41) 
 
-0.25 
(0.41) 
Age 45-54 -0.78 
(0.50) 
 
-0.78 
(0.50) 
Age 55+ -0.28 
(1.14) 
-0.25 
(1.13) 
Other Control Variables   
Ideology     -0.44** 
(0.12) 
 
    -0.28** 
(0.12) 
White     -0.68** 
(0.29) 
 
   -0.46* 
(0.29) 
Female -0.03 
(0.26) 
 
0.16 
(0.27) 
Income 
 
  -0.16* 
(0.10) 
 
  -0.18* 
(0.10) 
College 
 
    0.67** 
(0.33) 
 
  0.66* 
(0.34) 
Outlook    0.75** 
(0.28) 
 
   0.74** 
(0.29) 
Years in Current    
Residence 
0.07 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
Observations 492 484 
    *Significant at 10 percent level. 
**Significant at 5 percent level. 
 
